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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 16-3068 
 ___________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
         
 v. 
 
 DARIAN TENSLEY, 
                                                                          Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 3:15-cr-00108-001) 
 District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2017 
 
 Before:  MCKEE, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 






FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
In August 2013, while serving a lengthy federal drug sentence at Schuylkill FCI,1 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Darian Tensley became agitated during a routine pat-down conducted by Officer Jim 
Siedel.  During a brief scuffle, Tensley spun around and punched Siedel in the face.2  
Almost two years later, Tensley was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111 (“Assaulting, 
resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees”), entered an open plea of guilty, and 
was sentenced to 33 additional months in prison.  The only issue now on appeal is 
whether the District Court correctly overruled Tensley’s objection to a two-level 
sentencing enhancement for causing Siedel “bodily injury,” a decision we review for 
clear error.3 
The relevant definition of “bodily injury” is found in the Application Notes to 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1: “any significant injury; e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or is 
of a type for which medical attention ordinarily would be sought.”  Whether an injury is 
“significant” is a fact- and record-dependent inquiry that looks to whether the injury was 
more than trivial or minor.  Relevant factors include the degree and duration of the pain 
and discomfort experienced by the victim, as well as the character of any medical 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 See M.D. Fl. Crim. No. 8:03-CR-00227; see also Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) ¶ 60 
(reflecting a 327-month sentence for selling 53.8 grams of crack cocaine). 
2 The PSR says that Tensley threw and landed two punches, see PSR ¶ 5, but the 
sentencing transcript reflects only a single punch, see App’x 29.  
3 See United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1217 (3d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 
Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 220–22 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing clear error review in the 
context of Guidelines determinations).  We have jurisdiction to answer this question 




The government submitted two exhibits to the District Court in support of the 
proposed enhancement.  The first was a contemporaneous incident report that briefly 
described Officer Siedel’s injuries: “Suffered contusion to [his] upper and lower 
lips/swelling, small laceration, interior lower lip . . . .”5  Siedel was “instructed” to 
“follow-up with the local hospital.”6  The second exhibit was a set of full-color photos of 
Siedel’s face, time-stamped within five minutes of the attack.  They show Siedel with a 
bloody nose and a cut inside lower lip.7  No formal medical report was introduced into 
the record. 
 The government then called Officer Siedel to the stand during Tensley’s 
sentencing hearing, which was held almost three years after the incident.  At the hearing, 
Siedel discussed his injuries, which he described as “very” painful.8  With regard to 
medical intervention, he testified that the emergency-room doctors had examined his 
mouth (to ensure his teeth were not loose) and X-rayed his arm.  He was told that he 
would probably have headaches for a few days (he did) and to treat them with over-the-
                                                 
4 See Harris, 44 F.3d at 1217–19. 
5 App’x 57.  Siedel also sustained an injury to his elbow and left hand while restraining 
Tensley after the attack. See App’x 38.  
6 App’x 57. 
7 See App’x 56.  The copy in the appendix is in black and white; the color photographs 
are available on the District Court’s docket at ECF No. 46.   
8 App’x 38–39.  
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counter pain medications.  Siedel returned to work the next day—“psychologically, it was 
a little tough”—and experienced some swelling that affected his ability to smile.9  He 
later clarified that he required no follow-up medical attention and that his teeth were fine.  
Moreover, on cross, he candidly conceded that he received no treatment for his lip 
injuries and that the X-rays revealed nothing amiss.  And he agreed with defense counsel 
that it was “fair” to say “there was no treatment at the hospital, other than X-rays and an 
evaluation that there was no damage done.”10   
Relying on two out-of-Circuit cases, Tensley argues on appeal that the injuries 
Siedel sustained were not “significant” and thus could not support the “bodily injury” 
sentencing enhancement.  The first case, the Tenth Circuit’s 2006 decision in United 
States v. Mejia-Canales,11 has similar facts: a federal inmate struck a guard in the face 
and head, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111, and received the bodily-injury 
enhancement in District Court.  The successful appellate challenge to the enhancement in 
Mejia-Canales, however, grew out of the government’s failure to provide an adequate 
factual basis for applying it.  The guard’s injuries were minor, consisting of a head 
wound and a small oral cut; the record contained only three poor-quality photographs and 
the PSR’s brief description of the wounds.  Moreover, the guard did not testify.12  The 
                                                 
9 App’x 40.  
10 App’x 43.  
11 467 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2006). 
12 Id. at 1281, 1283–84.  
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Fifth Circuit reached much the same conclusion, for much the same reason, in United 
States v. Zuniga,13 the other decision Tensley relies on.  There, the Fifth Circuit described 
evidence of the injury—a single eyewitness statement about the victim being “trampled” 
and experiencing pain in her arm—as “sparse.”14   
We believe the record here is sufficient to support the application of the 
enhancement under our deferential review for clear error.  Unlike in Mejia-Canales and 
Zuniga, the victim here testified about his injuries, saying that they were painful and had 
aftereffects that lasted for days—both factors that can support a finding of bodily injury.15  
The full-color photographs, meanwhile, show Siedel bleeding from his mouth and nose.  
While the medical attention revealed nothing serious and the testimony about 
psychological trauma might not bear on the enhancement,16 the record was such that the 
                                                 
13 720 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
14 Id. at 593. 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Maiden, 606 F.3d 337, 338, 340 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
enhancement when PSR contained victim’s statement that, after being sprayed in the eyes 
with pepper spray, she felt a burning sensation that prevented her from wearing contact 
lenses).  
16 It is unclear whether the District Court took this part of Siedel’s testimony into 
account.  We do not appear to have decided whether mental anguish alone, such as 
trauma arising from the fact of the attack itself—as distinguished from mental distress 
that illuminates or arises from an injury and bears upon its significance—can be a 
component of a “bodily injury” determination.  See, e.g., United States v. Lanzi, 933 F.2d 
824, 827 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding no clear error when “psychological injury” was 
deemed not to amount to “bodily injury”); cf. United States v. Spinelli, 352 F.3d 48, 58 
(2d Cir. 2003) (finding psychological injury could constitute “serious” and “permanent or 
life-threatening” bodily injuries, whose definitions in the Application Notes to § 1B1.1 
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District Court could reasonably find that Siedel suffered a “significant” injury.  And 
when there are two reasonable views of the evidence, a choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous.17 
In sum, we find no clear error in the District Court’s judgment of sentence.  It will 
be affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
include damage to “mental faculty”).  The record here was sufficient to apply the 
enhancement without that testimony, so we leave the question for another day.  
17 United States v. Waterman, 755 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2014). 
